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“The paradox of punishment is that a penal institution somewhat similar to that in use 
in our society seems from a moral point of view to be both required and unjustified. 
Usually such a statement would be a confused way of saying that the practice is a 
necessary evil, hence it is justified, all things considered. But in the case of punishment 
this reduction does not appear so simple…”~ Alan Goldman1 
Setting the Stage: Memories and Reflections on Punishment 
	  
 My motivation for writing on what I have come to call “the tragedy of punishment” 
is the seemingly paradoxical state of affairs associated with punishment. The first state of 
affairs is the general understanding that punishment is not just a necessary practice but 
also a morally good one that serves not only to give criminals their just deserts but also 
generally benefit society and those in it.  The second state of affairs is the realization that, 
despite the understanding that punishment is painted as a moral good, when thinking 
about all the harm caused by punishment one cannot help but feel badly about it. The 
problem arises with the obvious conclusion that these two state of affairs seem at the very 
least problematically counterintuitive. How can it be that doing a moral good ends up 
leaving us feeling bad? In fact, many cases in which a morally good action is committed 
are cause for celebration but not so for punishment. What then makes punishment 
different from the other cases in which the result is supposed to be a good? It is an answer 
to this question that motivates the rest of the paper. 
 I began to realize the paradoxical nature of the conflict between the justification 
and response to punishment throughout my upbringing as I found myself becoming more 
and more familiar with punishment, its effects, causes and justifications. Not to mention 
some excellent philosophy courses, this motivation has been further fueled by a desire to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Quote	  taken	  from	  Goldman’s	  “The	  Paradox	  of	  Punishment”(1979)	  
Tragedy of Punishment                                                                                                                    	  4	  
	  
suggest ways in which to make viable positive change to the way punishment is 
conducted by presenting an alternative that does not leave us with such a counterintuitive 
response.  
If nothing else, through this philosophical exploration of punishment and the way 
it is carried out, I mean to shed some light on why encounters with punishment, such as 
those I had in my childhood, had room for the intuition that something tragic was going 
on in punishment. The consequences, then, for this disturbing but perhaps diagnostic 
intuition are feelings of remorse that run concomitant with harm caused by punishment. 
While it may not, at least initially, seem surprising that punishment - which at its core 
involves the infliction of suffering on others - is remorseful in some sense, the interesting 
questions arise when we consider that there is no room for remorse in other cases in 
which individuals get what they deserve. Furthermore, as remorse is generally an 
emotional response to one’s own actions, as I will address later, there is an interesting 
question as to how remorse could be an appropriate response to someone else’s 
punishment. Before I begin with my arguments as for how there could possibly be room 
for remorse in cases of seemingly “deserved punishment,” I believe an explanation of 
some of personal experiences will help further outline the issue at hand by presenting a 
small, but compelling, image of exactly the type of counteractive state of affairs our 
societal commitment to punishment has caused.   
Beginning at a young age, I was exposed to numerous instances in which 
punishment counterintuitively succeeded in causing a disproportionate amount of harm. 
This might not initially seem particularly concerning because problems of balancing the 
cost with the benefits of punishment is not, by any means, a novel problem. However, the 
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harm I’m referring to in these instances goes beyond the traditional sense of harm that is 
associated with punishment i.e. the suffering caused by incarcerating a person and thus 
curtailing certain fundamental rights or the suffering caused when a misbehaving child is 
sent to bed without supper. During the most sensitive stages of my early childhood 
development I was, just like most children, insulated to a certain degree from these 
traditional or expected harmful elements of punishment. While, as I explore later, there is 
indeed room for remorse in the traditional suffering caused by punishment, it was the 
lack of positive change that came as a result of punishment that initially caught my 
attention from a very early age. What I mean by lack of positive change is that, at least in 
these particular encounters with it, punishment resulted neither in the betterment of 
society or the accused. Furthermore, beyond that, in these cases punishment also instead 
served as a catalyst in compounding the issues that caused the wrongdoing in the first 
place such as poverty or feelings of societal marginalization.  
My intention by sharing these experiences are by no means some mere literary 
exercise in storytelling. Furthermore, I am by no means naïve enough to assert that my 
personal experiences with punishment are necessarily indicative of the consequences of 
punishment in general, though it is precisely my worry that they are.  In other words, 
though I will base the core of my thesis on facts and arguments independent of my 
personal experience, the real concern is that my experiences were merely a microcosm of 
a much broader state of affairs which I will eventually show is the case. However, at this 
point, all I am claiming is that even at a young age my intuitions made it painfully clear 
that there was something paradoxical about punishment that left room for feelings of 
remorse.  
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Exactly how I came to the conclusion that my negative experiences with 
punishment were likely not that unique from the experiences of many others was in the 
realization that my upbringing was not particularly extraordinary. I grew up, went to 
school, played with friends just like countless other children. Though many of the 
specifics may vary, I realized that the end result was likely not that unique. Therefore, if 
it was indeed true that my experience reflected a more broad state of affairs - as I had 
begun to suspect was the case - then the fact that there was such room for remorse in 
punishment due to disproportionate harm involved could even be described as a tragedy 
especially when we consider the grand scope punishment encompasses.  
Furthermore, I do not have any delusions as to what extent this paper will succeed 
in producing the kind of positive changes I am suggesting in order to curb our regret. The 
problems of balancing the harms and benefits of punishment have been around for 
centuries. Instead, at the very least, I only hope to contribute to the academic 
conversation concerning the philosophical justifications for punishment and the 
subsequent arguments for the best way punishment should be carried out. 
So then the obvious follow up question would be what childhood experiences 
could have motivated me so strongly and how could they be relevant in framing such a 
broad issue. As a child, I distinctly recall watching friends and family members destroyed 
and corrupted by the drastic imbalance in the amount of harm produced by punishment, a 
practice that was portrayed to be good. Growing up in a small but diverse town in upstate 
New York, I was exposed to a veritable panoply of people. There were rich people, poor 
people, black people, white people, Hispanic people, Chinese people, middle class people, 
and pretty much everything in between. As a result of this diversity, I was, therefore, 
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exposed to people with all kinds of criminal histories and also to peers with varying 
dispositions for criminal activity. 
 While a notable amount of people I knew in some capacity had deleterious run-
ins with the law, the one that had the greatest impact on me involved my cousin, whom I 
will here call Derrick. To put it lightly, Derrick grew up in a hostile environment at home. 
His mother and father fought regularly, until they eventually had an ugly divorce, when 
Derrick was in his early teen years.  
I realize that many people have been the victims of childhood divorce, inadequate 
parenting and even abuse and did not end up like Derrick did.  However, given the kind 
of person that Derrick was and the kind of support he craved, his convoluted relationship 
with his parents was particularly detrimental to him, especially at such an impressionable 
age. By his own admission, all Derrick really ever wanted was to get the respect, love, 
and attention from his parents he saw his friends and sister receive. Because, unlike his 
sister, he was not able to succeed without lots of encouragement and support from his 
parents, he floundered and became angry and rebellious. Now, in retrospect, he can trace 
his desire to rebel and act out to his base desire to get any kind of attention from his 
parents, either positive or negative.2 
 While in many cases innocuous, the problem with Derrick’s desire for attention 
was that, unfortunately for him, attention was not readily available in Derrick’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  There	  might	  be	  a	  concern	  about	  the	  ability	  of	  an	  individual	  to	  correctly	  identify	  the	  source	  of	  their	  
problems	  even	  in	  retrospect.	  I	  acknowledge	  this	  possibility	  but	  add	  that,	  now	  after	  being	  separated	  from	  
this	  situation	  for	  a	  number	  of	  years	  as	  well	  as	  having	  consulted	  professional	  opinion,	  I	  have	  reason	  to	  
believe	  Derrick’s	  conclusion	  not	  to	  mention	  my	  own	  observations.	  In	  addition,	  even	  if	  he	  was	  mistaken	  
this	  example	  can	  still	  legitimately	  act	  as	  one	  of	  my	  motivations	  to	  write	  on	  this	  topic	  because	  it	  would	  be	  
very	  easy	  to	  imagine	  a	  case	  where	  this	  was	  indeed	  true	  and	  in	  that	  case	  my	  assertions	  as	  to	  its	  tragic	  
nature	  would	  still	  hold.	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household. The lack of attention from his father, a young professional obsessed with 
making his way through medical school, and his mother, a woman with no choice but to 
work more than full time to pick up the slack, caused problems even at a young age. For 
example, at the age of ten he stole a hundred dollars from an envelope on my mother’s 
kitchen table so that he could by the Walkman tape player to impress his friends in 
another attempt to get attention. While, in this case, all that resulted was an 
admonishment about the wrongs of stealing followed by a tearful apology, unfortunately 
this incident was only the beginning of a lifetime of problems fueled by a desire for 
attention and support.  
As time passed, things at home continued to decline with ever-increasing fights. 
He was put on medication for his ADHD but it did nothing for problems caused by the 
lack of stability in his life, so he continued to misbehave. By his teenage years he was 
already well involved with the wrong crowd and it was then that he started to experiment 
with marijuana, cigarettes and alcohol. His increasingly hostile home environment 
naturally started to affect his school work and his dealings with authority figures. As one 
might expect, he was in detention more often than not and had been suspended on 
numerous occasions. Still the root of the problem, his relationship with his parents, had 
not been addressed. 
At the age of fifteen, Derrick had his first real encounter with the law. One day, 
just like any other, he went with his friends after school to hang out. On this day, 
however, his friends had slightly different plans. His closest friend, the unofficial leader 
of the group, decided he was going to take some money belonging to his grandfather that 
he had stashed away under the bed. Upon arriving to the house, Derrick was told to wait 
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outside and keep watch. Within moments the police arrived having been tipped off by a 
neighbor and so started Derrick’s long and tangled relationship with the law.  
Despite his mother’s and his defense team’s attempt to appeal to his turbulent 
home situation, impressionable age and lack of life experience in making appropriate 
moral judgments to recommend counseling or some other means to address his troubled 
relationship with his parents, he was sent to a boy’s home. In fact, he languished in this 
boy home for almost two years. Here, his quality of education was even worse than 
before as was his motivation to strive for success. Furthermore, day after day he was 
exposed to dozens of other angry and troubled youths whose bitterness and resentment at 
the system only served to compound his own conflicted feelings. At the core of it all, the 
cause of his misbehavior, his self-admitted frustrated and desperate attempt to get his 
parent’s affection, remained unaddressed. 
This was not Derrick’s last stint in a “correctional facility”. After that, he spent an 
additional 10 years in prison for crimes that came out of yet further drama with his 
mother who, despite a tremendous amount of love, support and effort, had no idea how to 
help her son. To this day his relationship with his mother remains tenuous and he is not 
on speaking terms with his father. As a result of the residual friction, not surprisingly, 
Derrick continues to have some minor run-ins with the law. However, as his relationships 
with his parents have stabilized and as he has sought a regimented consoling schedule to 
deal with residual feelings he has been able to avoid any further major issues with the 
criminal justice system.  
Importantly, Derrick and anyone familiar with the case will be the first to admit it 
was not the criminal justice system that helped him. In fact, he once told me the only way 
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he got through it was with a lot of love and deference from his loved ones. For Derrick, 
the criminal justice system has only succeeded in producing another resentful and 
unemployable young man. I will also add that this young man, who despite his problems, 
showed a great aptitude for applied sciences such as automotive technology. 
Unfortunately, he was never able to capitalize on his aptitude due to his incarcerations 
and criminal record. 
However, there is much more to punishment and its tragic elements than 
punishment that the state is involved in. In fact, the worry of disproportional harm does 
not only extend to those instances in our criminal justice system but, in my experience, 
also included parental punishment carried out in the seclusion of friends’ homes, and 
especially punishment given by schools. It is no secret and neither is it contested that our 
education plays a vital role in our ability to achieve future success. Therefore, when we 
consider this inexorable role that school and, more broadly, our education has on our 
success, it is easy to see how reckless punishment on the part of schools can drastically 
affect a student’s future. In essence, if a student has an educational experience that suffers 
as a result of disproportionately harmful punishment, deserved or otherwise, it is easy to 
see how it would be much harder for that student to overcome these obstacles and go on 
to achieve success.  
Beyond what happened to my cousin, I recall watching as my fellow students 
found themselves caught up in endless successions of detentions and in school and even 
out of school suspensions. While it would be imprudent to explain my specific reasoning 
for coming to this conclusion in each of these cases, what I will say is having witnessed 
what happened with Derrick and listening to the reasons given by these students to 
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explain their behavior, in many of these cases the cause of the misbehavior remained 
unaddressed.  
In particular, what I witnessed was the consequence of the school’s perceived 
need to punish misbehaving students to maintain their authority combined with the 
inability to address the root cause of the misbehavior. This perceived need to punish 
misbehaving students invariably led to a sad but inevitable cycle in which these students, 
due to their disruptive behavior, had to be separated from the other students. However, by 
being separated from other students, they were also separated from the standard learning 
environment. While in principle it might not be a bad thing to separate bad students in 
favor of a different educational environment, the problem came as result of the way this 
was executed.  Instead of being placed in an alternative but equally educational 
environment, these students were expected to complete their classwork in a completely 
unconducive learning environment filled with other unruly students.  Furthermore, 
together these students were taught by a small separate group of teachers whose expertise 
was not in teaching the required course materials but rather in wrangling rowdy children 
thus leading to a substandard educational experience.   
I can say from personal experience, the educational outcomes were far different 
for these children than for those who, for whatever reason, did not have the same 
debilitating dispositions for mischief.  In fact, most of these students did not go to college 
and some didn’t even graduate high school. Others are currently serving jail time for drug 
offenses. Some have children and work at minimum wage jobs. Very few went to college 
or currently live above the poverty line.  
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I can also say from personal experience that these sad outcomes are far different 
from the other students who did not have behavior problems, most of whom went to 
college and now have full time employment. While I can make no definitive claim that it 
was a direct consequence of their negative experiences with school punishment that led to 
their shortcomings, the correlation seemed too strong to ignore.  
Now, where my experiences becomes relevant to the general issue of punishment 
I’m trying to outline here is in the worry that my educational experience is only a 
microcosm of a broader issue.  In other words, if it turned out to be the case that my 
educational experience was indicative of a larger trend in how punishment is handled in 
our schools, that would present us with a state of affairs in which there is lots of room for 
both tragedy and remorse in the way punishment is conducted in our schools. Again, as it 
would not be particularly interesting to simply point out that badly executed punishment 
is tragic in some sense, the interesting questions arise when we consider the fact that this 
punishment is not undeserved. These kids really did misbehave and become disruptive. 
That being said, then the question at hand is if all that is happening here are students 
getting what they deserve, then why is there room for an element of remorse that is not 
present when say a student is given an equally deserved A on test. 
Furthermore, because school punishment falls under the purview of private 
punishment,3 what this suggests is that, even in private punishment, there is room for 
tragedy. Beyond that, it is easy to imagine how in other forms of private punishment such 
as a parent punishing a child or even a friend punishing a friend for a perceived slight 
there may also be room for remorse. Given that, it would seem that there is something 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Punishment	  that	  is	  not	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  state	  and	  includes	  punishment	  handed	  out	  by	  parents,	  
teachers,	  friends	  etc…	  
Tragedy of Punishment                                                                                                                    	  
13	  	  
just about punishment in general that makes room for remorse where there is not in other 
matters of desert. 
For much of my life I did not know what to make of these experiences and 
observations. I’ve always felt there was something tragic about punishment but, at the 
same time, I couldn’t put my finger on exactly what that was. For a while, I resolved that 
it must just be some squeamishness on my part at the thought of other people suffering 
that provoked me into seeing tragedy and feeling remorse when there was no need. After 
all, I was convinced that the punishment was both a matter of just deserts and doing what 
was necessary for the preservation of society. As I searched for a rational or justifiable 
reason to explain my discontent I was always faced, time and time again, with the same 
conundrum: why is it that there is room for remorse in deserved punishment but not 
seemingly in other cases of getting what one deserves? It is my attempt to answer this 
question and my subsequent attempt to quiet this concern that will occupy the majority of 
the remainder of this paper. 
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Paradigm cases and Punishment 
	  
Beyond particular cases, such as those described in the above chapter, that serve 
to illustrate how punishment paradoxically leaves so much room for remorse as a 
response to harm it causes, there is a more general question as to what distinguishes 
punishment from other scenarios in which individuals get what they deserve. It would 
seem almost a tautology that doing a morally good thing for a good reason to people who 
deserve it is an action that should produce no remorse4. If we define remorse on even the 
most rudimentary terms, it would involve some deep feelings of regret or guilt for a 
perceived mistake or wrongdoing. Even with this most basic understanding of remorse, it 
does not make sense to feel remorse in cases in which, not only is there no wrongdoing, 
but something morally good has been accomplished. In fact, I would go so far as to claim 
that not only is there no need for remorse in most of these cases, more specifically, there 
is no room for remorse. It seems nonsensical to feel any remorse for doing a morally 
good thing for good reasons and even more so when it is deserved. While the mere fact 
that we might call something a “morally good action” might even already suggest it was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  From	  this	  point	  forward	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  the	  “no	  vacancy	  principle”	  because	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  any	  
remorse	  in	  these	  cases.	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done for a good reason and was also deserved, I use these further stipulations in this 
formulation in the interest of making this principle I call the no vacancy principle as 
convincing and uncontroversial as possible. To clarify, what I mean by remorse is not the 
same as regret. As will be explained later, regret is a far more general term that does not 
carry with it the same level of moral weight or responsibility.  
Importantly, the fact there is room for remorse in instances of punishment does 
not mean that there is a need for remorse. I recognize that not everyone will have the 
same emotional response to punishment that I did. Why the fact that there is room for 
remorse is important is because while it would not be inappropriate to respond to 
punishment with feelings of remorse in the cases outlined below no such room exists. 
What I aim to explain is precisely what about punishment makes room for remorse that 
does not exist in other cases where individuals get what they deserve. 
 If I have thus far been unsuccessful in being convincing in my claim, then we 
need to look no further than our experiences and most basic moral intuitions to tell us the 
no vacancy principle holds true in almost every case. Let’s consider the following case: a 
friend, over dinner, tells you that she has received a raise for all the extra work she has 
been doing at her firm. In this case I would say there is no need for you to feel remorse. 
This follows from the no vacancy principle. First, it is good, notwithstanding salient 
moral complications5, to compensate employees justly.6 Secondly, the good reason, 
among others, is because it encourages employees to perform well and builds amicable 
employee-employer relations. It is also intrinsically good in the sense that we can prima 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  For	  example,	  we	  might	  not	  say	  the	  same	  thing	  if	  by	  giving	  this	  employee	  a	  raise,	  it	  robs	  another	  
individual	  of	  money	  they	  need	  to	  feed	  their	  family.	  
6	  In	  this	  case	  all	  I	  mean	  by	  just	  is	  receiving	  what	  she	  deserves	  which	  should	  not	  conflict	  with	  any	  notion	  of	  
justice.	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fascia claim it is good to act justly. Finally, she deserves it because she actually did go 
above and beyond and thus merits corresponding pay7.  
Importantly, this type of scenario is not unique by any means. In fact, we could 
say very much the same thing if this friend was to receive an award for doing excellent 
research, winning a marathon, placing second in a chess tournament or raising the most 
money at the company bake sale. What I mean to show by this example is that in cases 
where the consequence of getting what one deserves is a reward of some kind, there does 
not seem to be any room for remorse, at the very least if the reward does not come at 
some salient cost.  
We can also imagine many similar cases where there is a slightly negative cost 
involved. Let’s consider the not unfamiliar case of two friends going to see a midnight 
movie premier. However, one of the friends forgets her wallet at home. So as not to miss 
the premier, she asks her companion to borrow the money. The companion happily 
complies and even buys the popcorn. A week later, upon meeting in the cafeteria, the 
borrower pays back her friend in full. 
Just as in the reward cases, I would argue there is no room for remorse in what I 
am calling the movie case. This makes sense considering that this too follows from the 
conditions of the no vacancy principle. First, we can easily call this a morally good action 
on the same grounds we can say we have a prima fascia moral obligation to keep our 
promises. Of course, we would not have this moral obligation if the conditions of the 
promise were immoral like they would be in a murder pact. Neither would we have this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7If	  this	  seem	  redundant,	  it	  just	  reinforces	  my	  point	  that	  these	  actions	  really	  are	  actually	  morally	  good	  and	  
thus	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  remorse.	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obligation if we were either physically unable to keep it or by doing so we would 
sacrifice some other morally salient concern like not being able to feed one’s kids. 
Because this case has none of these complications, we can say it is morally good that she 
paid back her friend8. 
 Second, one good reason for both the young lady and others in society to pay 
back their debts is that it reinforces a societal trust. In other words, it benefits society that 
we can trust each other to pay back their debts when they say they will because it is this 
trust that allows many financial intuitions to function like banks and credit unions. On a 
smaller scale, it is also reasonable for the young lady in this case to pay back her friend in 
order to keep an amicable relation with her companion.  
Finally, just as in the reward cases, there is an element of desert in this case as 
well as it could be argued that the friend deserves to paid. Not only is this what both 
parties can reasonably expect but also there are no extraneous moral concerns to impede 
the young lady’s ability to keep her promise. 
Where this is slightly different from the reward cases is that in this case there is a 
slight cost involved. In other words, in order to satisfy the requirements of desert one 
person has to suffer a loss of some kind. Furthermore, it might be reasonable to think that 
a potential source for the tragic elements of punishment could be in that punishment too 
there is a cost involved i.e. the individual rights and freedoms of the convicted. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  In	  any	  of	  these	  it	  would,	  of	  course,	  be	  very	  easy	  to	  add	  certain	  details	  to	  make	  these	  cases	  very	  
remorseful	  indeed.	  To	  the	  same	  degree	  it	  would	  be	  equally	  to	  add	  lots	  of	  details	  to	  an	  instance	  of	  
punishment	  to	  ameliorate	  the	  feelings	  of	  tragedy.	  However,	  all	  I	  am	  doing	  here	  is	  presenting	  viable	  and	  
commonplace	  examples	  of	  instances	  where	  people	  have	  been	  able	  to	  successfully	  get	  what	  they	  deserve	  
without	  making	  any	  room	  for	  remorse.	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what these cases show is that mere presence of some cost is not sufficient to produce 
remorse.  
Furthermore, just the reward cases, these type of scenarios where there is a slight 
cost involved but which still seemingly do not have room for remorse are not uncommon. 
For example, if I have to break a window to save someone from a burning building or 
have to get blood on my shirt to properly bandage a wound on the scene of a car accident, 
there is no room for remorse despite these costs, provided the people I am saving are not 
moral monsters. In these cases the costs are negligible when we consider the alternatives.  
Following this same pattern, let’s imagine one more case. Steve, like 
approximately 5% of male children in the US was a victim of sexual abuse in his 
childhood9. In this case over many years, his uncle repeatedly abused him in secret. Like 
many victims of sexual assault he never sought help or even reported what happened. 
This abuse was, as can be expected, a very damaging experience for Steve. He had issues 
in forming relationships of trust and was confused as to his sexual orientation. In fact, 
these experiences were so damaging that as a result, Steve engaged in the same sort 
abusive activity with his adolescent nephew. However, unlike what happened with Steve 
and his uncle, Steve was caught and openly admitted to his crimes. He was therefore 
sentenced to 30 years behind bars, forced to register as a sex offender and banned from 
unsupervised contact with children for at least 10 years after his prison sentence.  
At first glance this case too seems to follow the principles of the no vacancy 
principle and thus make no room for remorse. First, though a more detailed discussion of 
the justifications of punishment is forthcoming in the Goldman Chapter, we might 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9	  Information	  is	  from	  http://www.rainn.org/get-­‐information/statistics/sexual-­‐assault-­‐victims	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superficially claim this punishment is morally good on the grounds that we need 
punishment for society to survive10. In other words, punishment is a necessary self-
defense to the harm that wrongdoing can impose on society.  What’s more, there can be 
little doubt that this nephew is going to suffer life-long effects from this extended abuse 
just like Steve did.  
Secondly, we can certainly say that the punishment in this case is done for a good 
reason because a society, in general, cannot morally permit adults to sexually abuse 
children. Beyond that, a society certainly cannot have people walk around unimpeded if it 
is likely that this kind of behavior is going to continue. 
 Finally, although Steve’s own abuse may have played a factor, Steve is still a 
moral agent11 and thus deserves to be punished for the harm he admitted to causing12. In 
other words, we certainly cannot claim that his past excuses him all blame but perhaps his 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Here	  I	  am	  simply	  arguing	  that	  we	  must	  have	  some	  system	  of	  punishment	  in	  order	  to	  preserve	  society.	  In	  
other	  words,	  unless	  the	  society	  in	  question	  is	  a	  society	  of	  saints,	  crime	  will	  be	  an	  inevitable	  problem.	  Here	  
what	  I	  mean	  by	  crime	  are	  the	  actions	  which	  when	  perpetrated	  against	  other	  people	  cause	  significant	  
harm	  or	  the	  kind	  of	  harm	  that	  if	  permitted	  would	  severely	  impede	  the	  ability	  of	  the	  other	  members	  of	  
society	  to	  exercise	  their	  fundamental	  rights.	  Examples	  of	  such	  rights	  would	  be	  the	  freedom	  from	  bodily	  
harm,	  the	  ability	  to	  own	  and	  protect	  one’s	  own	  property	  and	  home	  and	  the	  right	  to	  pursue	  one’s	  
conception	  of	  the	  good-­‐life	  provided	  it	  does	  not	  involve	  harming	  others.	  Any	  society	  that	  did	  not,	  at	  the	  
very	  least	  protect	  these	  most	  fundamental	  rights,	  would	  fail	  to	  serve	  the	  most	  basic	  function	  of	  a	  state.	  
Simply	  put,	  if	  a	  state	  cannot	  protect	  its	  people,	  then	  it	  cannot	  reasonably	  be	  called	  a	  state	  at	  all.	  Even	  if	  
such	  a	  state	  could	  function	  to	  a	  limited	  degree,	  it	  would	  certainly	  be	  the	  kind	  of	  society	  in	  which	  I	  would	  
ever	  want	  to	  live.	  This	  is	  very	  similar	  to	  the	  argument	  made	  by	  Hyman	  Gross	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  his	  book	  
which	  he	  calls	  the	  self-­‐defense	  justification	  for	  punishment	  (add	  citation).	  This,	  however,	  only	  goes	  so	  far	  
as	  to	  prima-­‐fascia	  justify	  the	  existence	  of	  some	  system	  punishment	  at	  all	  but	  does	  not	  necessarily	  commit	  
itself	  to	  any	  particular	  type	  of	  institutionalized	  punishment.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  I	  do	  realize	  that	  these	  rights	  
that	  I	  claim	  must	  be	  protected	  are	  the	  same	  rights	  that	  are	  classically	  exalted	  by	  those	  who	  embrace	  the	  
philosophical	  liberal	  tradition,	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  liberalism	  espoused	  by	  Mill,	  Rawls,	  and	  Locke.	  Here	  I	  will	  
not	  defend	  my	  commitment	  to	  liberalism	  but	  instead	  will	  simply	  state	  as	  these	  are	  the	  values	  that	  all	  
modern	  state	  punishment	  seeks	  to	  protect,	  I	  need	  not.	  
	  
11	  a	  person	  who	  is	  capable	  of	  being	  held	  responsible	  for	  his	  actions	  
12	  There	  can	  often	  be	  a	  problem	  with	  converting	  criminal	  acts	  to	  deserved	  jail	  time	  but,	  in	  this	  case,	  let’s	  
assume	  that	  his	  punishment	  is	  objectively	  exactly	  what	  deserved.	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history does make his action less condemnable than the same crime perpetrated by a 
person without such a predisposition. 
Interestingly though, despite meeting the same standards of the no vacancy 
principle that was sufficient in the other two cases to leave no room for remorse, this case 
seems to stand apart from the other two. In other words, something here is slightly tragic 
where in the other two cases there isn’t. At the very least I would say there is something 
tragic in the mere fact that a man has lost 30 years of his life and countless privileges.  
A good way to draw the distinction between this case, the reward case and the 
cost case would be to consider the following thought experiment. If, for example, in the 
reward case there was a parade to celebrate the coworker’s achievements, we might think 
little of it. If in the cost case, there was a parade to celebrate the young lady paying back 
her friend, we might think it was grandiose or silly but not, by any means, morally 
reprehensible. It would make even more sense if we imagine a parade for the gentleman 
who got blood on his shirt after helping out at the accident scene. However, if we imagine 
holding a parade to celebrate Steve’s 30 year incarceration, there is something far uglier 
about that notion. However, at the end of the day they are all still cases in which someone 
gets what they deserve. The question then becomes why is it that the first two scenarios 
are cases that perhaps merit celebration where the last case does not. 
Furthermore, just as in the cases I outlined when I described my childhood 
experiences, in Steve’s case there is even more room for tragedy in that we could foresee 
that the punishment will do nothing to address the root cause of his “misbehavior” and 
perhaps even make him worse. Unfortunately, we need not work very hard to imagine 
that this case of punishment will be ineffectual at addressing the root cause of the 
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criminality is not because this case would by no means be alone in this regard. In fact the 
same could be said about the majority of criminals sentenced to prison time in the United 
States.  
Recidivism is the statistic used to measure the amount of criminal offenders that 
commit another offense and return to jail after release. In theory, if incarceration was 
successful in teaching the offender the error of her ways and in addressing the root cause 
of her criminality, then she would not have a need return to jail for further correction of 
her behavior. However, the statistics on the matter as reported by the U.S. Bureau of 
Justice demonstrate the level to which our criminal justice system fails to do that.  The 
statistics reveal the following:  
• “During 2007, a total of 1,180,469 persons on parole were at-risk of 
reincarceration.  This includes persons under parole supervision on 
January 1 or those entering parole during the year. Of these parolees, 
about 16% were returned to incarceration in 2007. 
• Among nearly 300,000 prisoners released in 15 states in 1994, 67.5% were 
rearrested within 3 years. A study of prisoners released in 1983 estimated 
62.5%. 
• Of the 272,111 persons released from prisons in 15 states in 1994, an 
estimated 67.5% were rearrested for a felony or serious misdemeanor 
within 3 years, 46.9% were reconvicted, and 25.4% resentenced to prison 
for a new crime. 
• These offenders had accumulated 4.1 million arrest charges before their 
most recent imprisonment and another 744,000 charges within 3 years of 
release. 
• Released prisoners with the highest rearrest rates were robbers (70.2%), 
burglars (74.0%), larcenists (74.6%), motor vehicle thieves (78.8%), those 
in prison for possessing or selling stolen property (77.4%), and those in 
prison for possessing, using, or selling illegal weapons (70.2%). 
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• Within 3 years, 2.5% of released rapists were arrested for another rape, 
and 1.2% of those who had served time for homicide were arrested for 
homicide.”13 
What these statistics seem to show unequivocally is that once an individual enters 
into a life of crime it is very difficult to escape from it. Moreover, if escape really is so 
difficult then the harm involved in punishment goes far beyond the expected suffering 
caused by incarceration. In other words, punishment by incarceration is a life-marking 
event which drastically effects future potential success.  
In the same way there is room for remorse in the case of criminal punishment, 
equally, there is room for remorse in the case of private punishment.  This type of 
remorse in imposing punishment has even gone so far as to become engrained in our 
popular culture and everyday practices. For  example, there are likely very few of us who 
haven’t heard a parent say to their child, either in real life or the media, “this hurts me 
more than it hurts you” as a sad anecdote to a time-out 
, a toy getting taken away or a spanking. What does that saying reflect if not a 
widespread feeling of reticence and remorse for handing down punishment even when 
deserved?  
What this chapter was designed to show is that there are many commonplace 
cases in which the result is that people get what they deserve. In most of those cases, 
even in ones in which there is a cost involved, there is no room for remorse. However, in 
punishment despite still being a matter of an individual getting what one deserves, there 
is room for remorse not only due to the expected suffering of punishment but also 
because this harm does not even aid in addressing the cause of the misbehavior.  
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  Taken	  from	  United	  States	  Bureau	  of	  Justice	  statistics	  at	  http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17	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Before moving on, it is important to note that some might argue that in both the 
reward case and the cost case there could still be room for remorse because often times 
for other people to be rewarded some people have to lose out. For example, if we imagine 
the promotion in the reward case we can also assume that because one person got 
promoted another did not. However, as will be further explained latter cases like this 
perhaps cause for regret but not remorse because while remorse implies some level or 
moral responsibility on the part of the agent, regret is a more general lamentation of an 
unfavorable state of affairs. 
Goldman on Punishment 
	  
In order to understand what exactly about our current criminal justice system 
makes room for remorse, it would be beneficial to look at the philosophical literature 
surrounding the issue.  One of the most respected and comprehensive attempts to 
characterize the seemingly counterintuitive aspects of our current system of criminal 
punishment was authored by Alan Goldman in his well-known article The Paradox of 
Punishment in 1979. 
 Goldman begins this influential article by laying out what he takes to be the 
fundamental paradoxical element of punishment which centers on a conflict of intuitions 
in that there is a seeming lack of justification for punishment, a practice that should, in 
principle, be justifiable. As Goldman says: “the paradox of punishment is that a penal 
institution somewhat similar to that in use in our society seems from a moral point of 
view to be both required and unjustified. Usually such a statement would be a confused 
way of saying that the practice is a necessary evil, hence it is justified, all things 
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considered. But in the case of punishment this reduction does not appear so simple” 
(Goldman, 42). What Goldman alludes to here is exactly my chief concern with 
punishment - why is it that doing something seemingly deserved and good seems like it 
could be construed as bad? 
Goldman then goes on to elaborate on exactly how the reduction of punishment to 
a necessary evil is not so easily accomplished. In particular, where Goldman thinks the 
problem arises is in the implausibility of the two major views on which punishment is 
justified - retributivism and utilitarianism. This view, commonly referred to as the mixed 
justification for punishment, seeks to avoid the objections brought on by attempts to 
solely use one of these theories exclusively to justify punishment by appealing to the 
criteria required to justify punishment.  
On the surface, the mixed justification of punishment seems to be an amicable and 
effective way of accomplishing the goal of justifying punishment. The arrangement 
works in the following way: “utilitarian criteria could be used to justify the institution, 
and retributive to justify specific acts within it; or utilitarian to justify legislative 
decisions regarding punishment, and retributive to justify enforcement decisions” 
(Goldman, 42). In other words, because broadly speaking  the utilitarian is concerned 
with assuring the greatest sum total of happiness for the greatest amount of people, 
legislation serving to giving power to a criminal justice system, whose job is to cause the 
suffering of a minority to ensure the greatest amount of benefit to society at large, is 
entirely reasonable. At the same time, because broadly speaking the retributivist is 
concerned with individuals getting what they deserve and not what they don’t, it follows 
from their position that harming criminals in an attempt to give them the suffering they 
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were due is also justifiable. However, despite the fact that this compromise position may 
certainly seem tempting, Goldman argues that “it is at least as problematic as its rivals” 
(Goldman, 43).  
Goldman begins his attack on the mixed justification by first focusing on what he 
perceives to be the weaknesses in the retributivist position.  He starts by considering what 
he takes to be the principal concern of the retributive thesis which he concludes centers 
on the precise amount of punishment that is justifiable in any given case or, in other 
words, the matter of determining a criminal’s desert. However, the problem lies in 
exactly showing how the criminal offender has acted in such a way as to warrant a 
justified imposition of harm on that individual or as Goldman puts it “if we are to show 
why [a criminal] cannot legitimately complain of injustice done to them by the 
imposition of punishment, we must argue they have forfeited those rights which we are 
depriving them” (Goldman, 43). Both Goldman and the retributivist—here represented by 
Herbert Morris—agree that if we did not have a way to explain how a criminal forfeits 
his rights by committing criminal acts, both criminals and members of society would not 
be convinced that the system was acting within the confines of justice.  
 Simply put, this kind of explanation as to how criminal acts warrant harm seems 
indispensable to the overall justification for the retributivist position. As Goldman points 
out, we need such a rationale because the kinds of rights deprivation caused by the 
imposition of punishment could not be justified by appealing to the overall societal 
benefits garnered by using criminals as examples due to their fundamental right as 
rational agents to not have their rights severely impeded on in the interest of benefiting 
others. 
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 Alternatively, one could argue that an implicit part of having rights in the first 
place is in the understanding that one also has the duty to respect the rights of others. 
Therefore, by violating the rights of others, as one does when he/she commits a criminal 
act, he/she has failed their duty and should acknowledge that by committing such an act 
he/she has tacitly agreed to forfeit his/her own rights in the process. However, as 
Goldman puts it “this partial justification of the right to impose punishment upon 
wrongdoers is retributive in spirit, but not identical to the classic theories of Kant or 
Hegel, nor to the well-known contemporary retributivist argument of Morris” (Goldman, 
43). What he means by this is that both the traditional and contemporary retributivist 
would not endorse such a justification for imposing harm on wrongdoers through 
punishment because they understand that no rational person would ever view their 
criminal activity as either conscientious or tacit consent to the forfeiture of her rights. 
Goldman then moves to elucidate as to exactly what Morris would say is the 
justification for imposing harm on others through punishment and subsequently why this 
treatment of the issue is still problematic. In particular, Morris views punishment as a 
means of “removing some benefit unfairly enjoyed by the criminal” (Goldman, 44).  
Goldman objects to this view first due to the impracticality of balancing each citizen’s 
benefits and burdens throughout their life time. Furthermore, Morris’ view also seems to 
have counterintuitive implications because in most cases the prospective unfair benefits 
gained from crimes against property are far higher than those gained from crimes against 
people even though crimes of people often involve the more severe harm and deprivation 
of rights.  
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Furthermore, even if we grant that by violating the rights of others the criminal 
implicitly consents to having her own rights violated, another problem arises when 
deciding exactly what rights the criminal forfeits. It is clear that it would not be just for a 
criminal to lose all of her rights by violating the rights of others. The easiest response 
would be that the wrongdoing forfeits whatever rights they violated in others; however, 
that is impractical in most cases. As a response to the issue of this impracticability, the 
obvious next step would be to propose that we are then justified in depriving the 
wrongdoer of an equivalent set of rights but that still leaves us with the problem of how 
to determine what constitutes an equivalent set of rights. 
Importantly, we must keep in mind that imposing excess harm beyond what is 
deserved on criminals is particularly problematic on the retributivist framework. If we 
think about punishment as a debt owed to society then, according to the retributivist, it 
makes sense that we require that debt be paid. It would however be unjust for us to 
require that a wrongdoer pay back considerably more than his debt by imposing more 
harm than is deserved through any excess of punishment. As Goldman puts it “if a person 
can be said to deserve only so much punishment and no more, then any excess appears to 
be as objectionable as an equivalent harm imposed on an innocent person” (Goldman, 46). 
Furthermore, Goldman claims that the apparent issues with equating punishment to 
individual crimes is demonstrated by the fact that philosophers have more readily and 
frequently applied the equivalent harm to benefit framework to cases of harm against 
innocents then in the everyday cases of punishment. 
The retributivist response to this difficulty in determining equivalent sets of rights 
would be, as Goldman summarizes it, “one right or set of rights is equivalent to 
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another…when an average preference scale registers indifference between the loss of 
either one or the other” (Goldman, 46). What he means by this is that two sets of rights 
are considered equivalent if from an objective point of view the loss of one or other 
would be equally acceptable and neither one would be preferential to save or discard. 
 However, this explanation of rights equivalence leaves the view open to the same 
objections often raised against the utilitarian. In particular, an opponent may claim the 
retributivist makes a mistake when she considers harm to the guilty and harm to the 
innocent on the same scale because it is precisely the right to have her interests 
considered equally that the wrongdoer does by harming others. What the objector 
concludes from this is that society then can be warranted in imposing greater harm on the 
guilty if by doing so society can garner some overall benefit in doing so which they find 
to be an unacceptable violation of our personal rights and autonomy.  The retributivist, 
however, can readily respond to this objection by clarifying that they are not actually 
advocating for the equal treatment of both the interest of the guilty and the innocent 
because in the case of the guilty they are imposing harm while in the innocent case harm 
is what they are trying to avoid.  
Having summarized what he takes to be an initially fair and plausible retributivist 
position, it is here in his paper that Goldman moves on to an analysis of a plausible 
utilitarian theory in an effort to further show the general problem with the mixed 
justification of punishment. In particular, Goldman summarizes the utilitarian position as 
stating “a political institution involving the administration of punishment by state 
officials can be justified only in terms of the goal of reducing crime and the harms caused 
by crime to a tolerable level. The state is not concerned to ensure that all its members 
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receive their just positive and negative deserts in some abstract moral sense”(Goldman, 
47) We must remember that this is stark contrast to the retributivist who is wholly 
concerned with individuals getting their just deserts. Even if the utilitarian grants to the 
retributivist that some people deserve to be harmed for their wrongdoing, where they 
disagree is the notion that the state should be the entity concerned with imposing that 
harm in every case. Because the utilitarian is fundamentally concerned with overall 
society benefits and burdens, in order for any wrongdoing to warrant state intervention 
the overall benefits of imposing punishment on the wrongdoer must decisively overcome 
the burdens and cost of imposing that punishment.  
It is a combination of this general utilitarian justification for the existence of penal 
institutions combined with the retributivist limitation of the kind and amount of harm we 
can justifiable impose on wrongdoers that forms the aforementioned highly endorsed 
mixed justification of punishment. Goldman summarizes the mixed justification a 
position that “views the social goal of punishment as deterrence, and yet recognizes that 
we are entitled to pursue this goal only when we restrict deprivation of rights to those 
forfeited by crime or wrongdoing” (Goldman, 48) 
While this compromise position may at first seem very compelling, Goldman is 
by no means convinced and, for the record, neither am I. Goldman’s first objection to the 
mixed justification that while it may succeed in avoiding the obviously unwanted 
outcome of permitting harm to innocents, it may not be equally successful in preventing 
excess harm to wrongdoers. If the general goal of the mixed theory is to provide 
meaningfully beneficial deterrence of future crimes by using the suffering of wrongdoers 
as an example as is the case, then it is likely that it would be able to avoid excessive 
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punishment imposed in the interest of making the required example of wrongdoers. 
Goldman then points out that for the mixed theorist a lot of harm is at stake if the 
deterrence is not effective because the rate of apprehension for almost any crime is less 
than half making excess punishment even more worthwhile given the considerable 
prospective benefits. 
It is this conflict between the seeming need to over punish wrongdoers in the 
interest of more effective deterrence to prevent future harms with our seeming obligation 
to restrict our punishment solely to what the wrongdoer deserves in the interest of justice 
that create the meat of the “paradox” in the justification of punishment. As always, 
Goldman eloquently summarizes the issue in the phrase “the limitation stipulated in our 
[retributive] premise, then, in effect, annuls our [utilitarian] premise. And yet pursuit of 
this goal seems morally required and impossible without effective punitive threats. Hence 
the paradox, or, more strictly, the dilemma. Whereas, much more could be added here as 
to Goldman’s extensive treatment of the mixed justification of punishment but I don’t 
want to linger her to long so as to distract from my arguments. 
In general, while Goldman’s arguments extend much more extensively what 
Goldman succeeds in doing here is providing good reason that suggests that the mixed 
justification of punishment, perhaps one of the most appealing and plausible justifications 
of punishment, is invalid on the grounds that the individual theses, the utilitarian and the 
retributivist, are independently objectionable. Therefore when they “mix” to form the 
mixed justification they bring all of their inadequacies and objections to the table as well 
making the mixed theory just as problematic as the elements it is comprised of. In other 
words, in this case the total is not greater than the sum of its two parts.  
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The question left then is: even if we agree with Goldman, what other alternative 
do we have then to justify punishment? Are we supposed to now conclude that 
punishment is really simply unjustified after all? Though it does diminish the work he 
does to refute the mixed justification of punishment, all Goldman is able to leave us with 
is a tentative alternative justification that still leaves many questions to be answered. In 
particular what Goldman suggests is that “The final, most fundamental, and most 
promising alternative would be (not surprisingly) to attack the social and economic 
causes of crime by reducing the great inequalities in our society. I have nothing to say 
against this, except that the means to accomplish it short of authoritarian political 
mechanisms have eluded us. But even were we to progressively achieve the egalitarian 
program and approach a just economic and social distribution, I believe that the moral 
problem de-fined here would remain, though perhaps in less acute form. Many would still 
be tempted to crime, and deterrence seemingly would still be required. It would still be 
true that genuinely just punishment would not suffice to deter avoidable harm to innocent 
members of the community, or to enforce genuinely just distributive rules” (Goldman, 
58). The thing I want to emphasize here is that at the end of all his analysis of commonly 
held positions for the justification of punishment, what Goldman finds to be the area most 
likely to lead to a justifiable system of punishment is precisely the area I wish to focus 
on-social inequities. 
What I endeavor to do in the rest of the paper is to answer the questions Goldman 
leaves out with his alternative. I would argue that while Goldman’s conclusion that the 
problem with punishment can be solved by addressing the root cause of criminality is 
nothing short of insightful, it is at the same time incomplete. What I suggest, not only 
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answers my fundamental concern with punishment— how is there room for remorse in 
what simply seems to be a matter of getting what one deserves—it also embraces 
Goldman’s suggestion that the solution to the problems of justifying punishment is 
addressing the inequalities in social conditions that have been shown to dramatically 
influence one’s propensity for criminality. In particular, what Goldman fails to 
acknowledge in his paper is precisely what motivated mine to begin with—the 
counterintuitive psychological and emotional response that we have to punishment. In 
other words, Goldman does not acknowledge the role the remorse we feel when we are 
demanded by justice to inflict suffering on wrongdoers in the form of punishment plays 
in suggesting precisely where the problem in justifying punishment lies.  Very briefly 
stated, the reason why we both have a hard time justifying punishment and, further, why 
we cannot help but feel remorseful when we punish is because we are in some sense 
complicit in causing the very criminal activity we then come to punish. The complicity 
comes as a result because as a society we allow the very disparities in social conditions to 
exist that are so fundamental in leading to wrongdoing.  To establish this controversial 
claim I will look to John Deigh’s and David Dolinko’s The Oxford Handbook of the 
Philosophy of Criminal Law on shared societal responsibility.  Additionally, while 
Goldman’s analysis made no mention of private punishment, understanding the problems 
of punishment as the results of complicity and allowing prevailing social disparities also 
sheds light on steps that could be taken to better address cases of private punishment such 
as what is done in our schools. 
However, while it may be helpful to understand what the root cause of our both 
our trouble justifying punishment as well as the reason for our feeling of remorse, it 
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would certainly be even more helpful to have a tractable alternative that addresses both of 
those concerns. The alternative I suggest is one which I have already discussed—
rehabilitation. Very briefly, despite the fact that Goldman doesn’t realize it, rehabilitation 
is a crucial way of achieving Goldman’s suggestion of addressing societal inequities 
because it fundamentally seeks not to continue to disadvantage and marginalize 
wrongdoers, but contrarily seeks to address the cause of their particular act of 
wrongdoing and help them to not repeat it. Rehabilitation also similarly allows for the 
justified execution of private punishment because by addressing our concerns with 
criminal punishment, due to fact that the concerns with private punishment are in essence 
the same, it address the elements of tragedy in private punishment as well. 
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Remorse, Social Injustice and Criminality  
	  
“We find that all of us, as a society, are to blame, but only the defendant is 
guilty”-Michael Maslin 
 
If remorse is generally understood as deep feelings of regret or guilt14 for one’s 
own actions, why then have I been using it to describe the psychological and emotional 
response that we often feel as a result of punishment that we have no personal role in 
imposing? In other words: how could I possibly claim that we are complicit in causing 
wrongdoing that you or I had nothing to do with? You or I didn’t tell Derrick to make 
those bad friends and participate in a robbery. We didn’t coerce the other students in my 
school into misbehaving and disrupting the classroom experience. We certainly didn’t 
force inner city youths to join gangs, sell drugs, steal cars or kill each other. In fact, most 
of us have never been personally involved in any major crime of any sort. However, 
while it may indeed be the case that most or all of us have never been a physical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14	  Here	  meant	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  analogous	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accessory or instigator of criminality, as a society we still permit the social conditions to 
flourish that encourage crime to prevail predominantly amongst those in the lowest 
socioeconomic classes. I argue that is precisely because of our permissibility of social 
injustice that we are complicit in wrong doing and, furthermore, the remorse we feel is 
warranted.  
There may be a general objection to the fact that I am suggesting that our 
emotional response to punishment is grounds to think that something about punishment is 
unjustifiable on the grounds that it would be imprudent to let emotional responses affect 
our rationality. In other words, the worry that we are permitting our feelings to allow us 
to become squeamish in the face of the ugly chore of making our fellow man suffer. 
However, what I am claiming here is not that it is our emotional response to punishment 
that leads me to the conclusion that our current system of punishment is unjustifiable but 
rather that by paying attention to our psychological/emotional response of remorse, we 
realize that this remorse has the ability to suggest punishment may be an instance in 
which we may be morally responsible to some degree. It is this important role that 
remorse has to play in suggesting our complicity that Goldman leaves out and it is here 
that I argue Goldman’s argument could be expanded as I attempt to do in this paper. 
Furthermore, before continuing it is important to make it clear exactly what I 
mean when I say that we are complicit in criminality. While there is a perhaps a more 
robust legal sense in which one can be complicit, the complicity I am referring to here is 
far more general. While both types of complicity, the legal and the more general, can lead 
to wrongdoing, the former implies some kind of malicious intentionality that I do not 
want to assume happens in the case of the social injustice we allow to prevail. In other 
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words, in the legal sense complicity is usually understood as either knowingly 
participating in a crime as an accomplice or intentionally lending aid to a criminal in 
some fashion-- for example, the getaway driver in a bank robbery. However, the sense of 
complicity I am referring to here does not necessarily involve this kind of intentional 
contribution to wrongdoing. Instead, the type of complicity I want to focus on here is the 
sense in which we can call a person who stands by and watches a man beat his wife in the 
streets and does nothing to intervene is complicit in causing her injury. More specifically, 
what I mean by complicit here is that in the case of the social injustice that leads to crime, 
although we could act in opposition to stop wrongdoing, we do not, thus making the 
inevitable crime partly our responsibility. 
A quote by Jeffery Reiman in the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Criminal 
Law sums up the mitigating factors caused by social inequities in the following way 
“[w]hen crimes are predictable responses to unjust circumstances, then those who benefit 
from and do not remedy those conditions bear some responsibility for the crimes and thus 
the criminals cannot be held wholly responsible for them in the sense of being 
legitimately required to pay their full cost” (Deigh, Dolinko, 446). What this quote 
suggests is that because a disproportionate amount of the criminal activity  in this country 
can be traced back to issues of social disparities that we, as a society, allow to prevail, we 
should not be so readily disposed to hand out “deserved punishment” because part of the 
blame lies with us as well. Beyond that, what I take from this type of sensitive theory to 
issues of social justice is that there really is a sense in which we are meaningfully 
responsible for wrongdoing and in which our feelings of remorse are a natural 
consequence of the role we play.  
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Importantly, the reason for the existence of such positions which call attention to 
the problems caused by disparities in social conditions is because issues of social justice 
do exist and both their existence and their relation to wrongdoing is supported by 
empirical evidence.  As is summarized in an article titled “Poverty, Urbanization and 
Crime” by Flango and Sherbenou in the journal Criminology “In an effort to evaluate the 
situational determinants of crime, principal components analysis was used to reduce 59 
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of 840 American cities to six 
independent factors: affluence, stage in life cycle, economic specialization, expenditures 
policy, poverty, and urbanization. When regressed upon crime rates two of these six 
factors, urbanization and poverty, were found to be the more important criminogenic 
forces” (Flango and Sherbenou, 331)  
Beyond that more general assertion as to the relation between poverty and crime, 
an article in the Justice Policy Journal of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice by 
Brown and Males titled “Does Age or Poverty Level best Predict Criminal Arrest and 
Homicide Rates” has managed to represent the correlation between poverty and violent 
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crime rates in form of a table of information as shown below.  
 
As can been seen from this data a significant portion of the people arrested for homicide 
in California in 2006  were either poor, young, or a member of a minority group. For 
example, 32.2% of the arrested people were Hispanic and another 6.3% percent were 
black and finally an average of 11% of the population were below the poverty line. A 
combination of these figures leaves us with a a total of 49.5% of the population of violent 
criminals who can be classified as members of disadvantaged or minority populations 
seemingly unequivocally supporting my thesis that social injustices and racial 
discrimination that we allow to prevail is a direct contributor to criminality.  
 The disparities can be further seen in the following graph from the same study 
which more specifically measures the members of each race arrested for poverty that 
were also below the poverty line. As can be seen below, the results are appalling, clearly 
showing that a disproportionate amount of crime committed by minority races, in this 
case Blacks and Hispanics, are below the poverty line. Perhaps most startling is that 
around a quarter of both Blacks and Hispanics who commit crime in the 15-19 age group 
are below the poverty line. This is particularly worrisome considering that crime 
committed at such an early age is often just the beginning of a life of deleterious run ins 
with the law as evidenced by cases such the one involving my cousin Derrick as well as 
the high rates of recidivism . 
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Finally, this last graph shows the rather compelling correlation between the 
severity of poverty and amount of that group responsible for violent crime amongst those 
in poverty who have committed violent crimes. For example, as can be seen in the age 
group 15-19, 76% of the impoverished people who commit crime are amongst the poorest 
bracket of people. In general this graph lends itself to the conclusion that the more severe 
the poverty, or in other words injustice, the more likely it is that person will be disposed 
to commit criminal acts. 
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In regard to the matter of private punishment, while I admit I do not address the 
relation between social injustice and non-criminal wrongdoing with the same rigor as 
with criminal offenses, using simply an appeal to common sense, I argue that in the same 
way that social injustice can be said to be a major factor in causing criminal offenses, it is 
easy to see how it can also cause wrongdoing outside of the purview of criminal law. For 
example, it would be easy to imagine how a high-stress and/or chaotic family 
environment caused by the constant pressures of poverty could cause substandard 
parenting. With the constant pressure to make ends meet, we can imagine how difficult it 
would be to pay the necessary attention to each child, especially in the case of a high 
need child.  
What I mean here by substandard parenting is parenting which fails to address the 
emotional, physical, or attention needs of the child. It is unlikely that such an 
overburdened parent would have time to read their children bedtime stories, take them to 
the park, bring them to various playdates or participate in many other hallmarks of great 
parenting. Neither would they likely be as disposed to encourage their child’s innate 
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talents and passions by paying for music lessons and instruments, buying sports 
equipment or arts. Neither would these parents be able to afford specialized daycare nor 
afterschool tutors to address any problems that may arise in a child’s education.  
Additionally, when we consider the sheer amount of social injustice we tolerate, 
the propensity for substandard parenting is even further increased. For example, when we 
consider the fact that because poverty often comes from a chain of poverty, it is likely 
that these parents might also lack positive role models because there parent’s too were 
substandard due to the stress poverty put on them.  
 Furthermore, we can also easily imagine how substandard or ineffective 
parenting would then lead to misbehavior in the children who, as a result of their 
occupied caretakers, lack the emotional support and attention they need. As a result, we 
can imagine how these children would seek that attention and support in unhealthy and 
potentially destructive ways   
Perhaps our complicity would not be so meaningful if it were the case that social 
injustice and its effects on criminal activity were unavoidable. However, this is not the 
case as is evidenced by the fact that many other countries do not have our problems with 
either social injustice or crime. Despite the fact that the United States is by no means the 
most populous country nor the poorest, as shown by the chart below, it has the highest 
prison population of any other country thus betraying a unique social injustice that we 
allow to persist and that we and we alone are responsible for. 
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All of this data serves to paint a compelling picture as to the fact that there is a 
salient correlation between crime and the societal injustice we allow to prevail. However, 
another factor to consider when contemplating the extent of our role in permitting the 
social injustices which in turn cause crime and other acts of wrongdoing is the extent to 
which we have the ability to change the social conditions that cause the problems. That is, 
because part of the nature of any moral obligation must be the ability to fulfill it and if it 
is not the case that we can fulfill the obligation in question, it is meaningless to say we 
“ought” to do so. However, as members of a democracy we do not have such an excuse. 
Part of the nature of a democracy is that, in principle, the people are responsible in a 
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relevant moral sense for the actions of their government. That means that although it is 
up to elected officials to actually determine and enforce legislation and distribution of 
resources that will ultimately determine the levels of social justice, we the people 
determine who makes those decisions. Because we do, in a relevant sense, have power to 
enact positive social change, we are responsible for the prevailing social conditions. 
 In order to remove our contemporary society from responsibility, some might 
argue that current social conditions are the products of generations of discrimination and 
other such factors we had no control over. While that may be the case, it is certainly true 
that, due to our relatively direct role in government, we do have the ability to force 
change in the interest of correcting the disparities as they become apparent.  In other 
words, it is not necessarily the fact that we cause the social conditions that lead to 
criminality that make us complicit enough to warrant remorse, but rather it is the fact that 
we allow these disparities to continue to prevail.  
With the understanding that such societal inequities exist in our very own society 
and with the further general understanding that this is a direct cause in creating the 
conditions for crime or other wrongdoing, it is no surprise that our emotional and 
physiological reaction to punishment is anything other than remorse. In fact, it is 
precisely due to our indirect involvement in criminality that I chose to use the term 
remorse as opposed to another such as regret. Sure, I can regret things that I am 
responsible for but those cases still do not always have the same weight as remorse which 
directly implies some moral failing on the part of the speaker. For example, I may “regret” 
when I decide to eat onions for lunch before an important business meeting. I can “regret” 
that it rained on the day I was supposed to go on a picnic. I can “regret” that I got caught 
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in traffic on the way home. I can “regret” that the store ran out of my favorite cereal. I 
can even regret seriously wrong things. For example, I “regret” that the holocaust and the 
apartheid occurred. However in none of these cases would the word remorse be 
appropriate because there was no involvement direct or indirect. I do not regret 
punishment like I regret eating onions or getting stuck in traffic; the response to 
punishment is much more meaningful. The term regret carries with it no sense of moral 
responsibility whereas the term “remorse” does. Unlike the holocaust or the apartheid to 
which I am entirely causally separated15, I am complicit in the social conditions that lead 
to crime and punishment thus making remorse the correct term. 
It is also important to note that complicity doesn’t always have to be 
straightforward in the same sense that one is straightforwardly complicit when she 
knowingly provides the guns for an armed bank robbery. Let’s consider a case where 
Randy buys a puppy. However, instead of training the dog to be friendly, roll over, play 
dead and such, he trains it to attack children using dummies and auditory stimulation. He 
lives by himself in a relatively remote location so he thinks and even hopes that his 
creation will never actually attack anyone but, for some reason, he finds training the dog 
in this way is pleasant for him. One day, some children on a hike in the mountains 
stumble upon Randy’s remote cabin property and are mauled by the dog. Despite the fact 
that Randy had nothing to do with the attack and the fact that he did not ever intend 
anyone to come to harm as a result of his actions, it would not be controversial to claim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15	  It	  would	  make	  sense,	  however,	  if	  members	  of	  the	  societies	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  permitted	  the	  conditions	  leading	  to	  
atrocities	  such	  as	  the	  holocaust	  and	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  apartheid	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  as	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  because	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that he is still complicit in the attack because if not for the fact that he created these 
dangerous conditions, the attack would not have taken place.  
In the same sense that Randy is in some sense responsible for the mauling of the 
child, we too are partially responsible for wrongdoing. In other words, just as Randy’s 
decisions to allow the conditions that would reasonably lead to the mauling of children 
makes him complicit in the mauling, because we allow the conditions that would 
reasonably lead to many of our impoverished and disadvantaged members of society to 
commit acts of wrongdoing, we are also complicit.  
It is important to note that it is not at all incompatible with my view that some 
crimes produce large amounts of remorse while others seemingly none at all. In some 
cases the societal externalities play a larger role than others. That is, some crimes can be 
more easily traced to social inequalities than others. For example, if we imagine a young 
man from Compton is arrested for selling drugs to children to feed his family, it would 
not be hard to reduce his criminality at least in part, to the well-known and violent, poor, 
and gang-ridden area in which he grew up. On the contrary, if a wealthy celebrity living 
in a Hollywood mansion was convicted of the same crime it would be very difficult to 
reduce his criminal act to social conditions that we as a society could be held complicit in 
creating. Because it is precisely our role in permitting the social conditions that lead to 
wrongdoing that leads to our remorse, it follows that in cases where the social conditions 
we created play little or no role in the criminal act in question we do not feel the same 
level of remorse, though it of course entirely reasonable that some may still regret the fact 
that another person is facing considerable suffering. 
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At this point it would make sense to address the natural objection to my rather 
controversial view which would take the form: if we are complicit in criminality, are we 
then unjustified in punishment?  However, what I am saying here does not necessarily 
mean that punishment is not justified but rather that in order to feel fully justified in 
imposing punishment and to avoid the feelings remorse we need to address the social 
inequities that plague our society. In particular, what I lay out in the next chapter is a 
system of punishment that does not seek to harm wrongdoers but rather to help them by 
addressing the root cause of their criminality which includes social inequities. Very 
briefly, what I propose is a system of punishment centered on rehabilitation. Because the 
goal of this rehabilitation centered punishment is to help the wrongdoer address the root 
cause of his criminal dispositions, we avoid feelings of remorse because we are working 
towards remedying precisely the social injustice which Goldman finds so troubling. 
Furthermore, we avoid the nasty consequence so prevalent in current punishment in 
which a wrongdoer spends painful months and years imprisoned only to be released to 
the same conditions which caused the criminality in the first place. In other words, 
criminal punishment neither has to be so painful for the wrongdoer or the bystander.  
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Rehabilitation as Punishment 
	  
Before proposing my final solution to the problem, it may be helpful to just 
briefly recap what I have done up to this point. Thus far what I have claimed is that the 
way in which punishment is currently carried out in our current criminal justice system 
paradoxically and invariably leads to deep feelings of remorse despite the fact it is 
supposed to be a morally good action. I then go on to claim that this remorse is a natural 
response to the fact that we are in some sense complicit in permitting the existence of the 
very social injustice that leads too much of our crime. However that leaves us with the 
important question of what to do next. Because punishment is, at the very least, necessary 
for the preservation of society, there may be a real worry, although not necessarily 
morally justifiable, for the greater good of society we must allow punishment to continue. 
If we recall, it is precisely this worry that motivated Goldman’s paper. However, as 
Goldman suggests in the final paragraph of his paper “the final, most fundamental, and 
most promising alternative [means of making punishment justifiable] would be (not 
surprisingly) to attack the social and economic causes of crime by reducing the great 
inequalities in our society” (Goldman, 58). In other words if we take action to address the 
social injustice that cause our feelings of complicity it need not be the case that 
punishment continue as necessary evil (but evil nonetheless). I argue in this chapter that 
way this can be accomplished is through a system of punishment focused on 
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rehabilitation which due to its central aim of addressing the cause of criminality, would 
ameliorate some of our complicity by striving to correct social injustice. 
It has been said that, perhaps a little in jest, that all philosophy is simply a 
footnote to Plato. Regardless of whether or not we can agree this is the case, what is 
undoubtable is that Plato, not surprisingly, had a well-developed theory of just 
punishment albeit spread out in several of his different works. Where this becomes 
relevant is that, as will be further explained throughout this chapter, it is precisely the 
kind of rehabilitation centered theory of punishment, though perhaps not in every detail, 
that I want to endorse. 
Plato begins the discussion of just punishment in his masterpiece, The Republic.  
While what he presents in the Republic is far short of comprehensive what Plato succeeds 
in doing is hinting at what will later become a far more robust theory of punishment in 
his later works and also laying down certain base principles on which his later writings 
will predicate. Interestingly enough, he does this rather by accident while attempting to 
accomplish something far more ambitious, define and characterize the true nature of 
virtue of justice. And just like many of Plato’s other philosophical conclusions, he lays 
out his argument in the form of a dialog using his teacher Socrates as the main character. 
The dialectic develops as follows: 
“Socrates:  Should a just man really harm anyone whatsoever? 
Polemarchus:   Of Course. He should harm those who are both bad and enemies. 
Socrates:  When horses are harmed, do they become better or worse? 
Polemarchus:  Worse. 
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Socrates:  With respect to the virtue16( that makes dogs good, or to the one that 
makes horses good? 
Polemarchus:  With respect to the one that makes horses good. 
Socrates:  And when dogs are harmed, they become worse with respect to the 
virtue that makes dogs, not horses, good? 
Polemarchus:  Necessarily. 
Socrates:  And what about human beings, comrade; shouldn’t we say that when 
they are harmed, they become worse with respect to human virtue? 
Polemarchus:  Of course. 
Socrates:  But isn’t justice human virtue? 
Polemarchus:  Yes, that’s necessarily so, too. 
Socrates:  Then, my dear Polemarchus, people who have been harmed are bound 
to become more unjust. 
Polemarchus:  So it seems. 
Socrates:  Now, can musicians use music to make people unmusical? 
Polemarchus:  No, they can’t. 
Socrates:  Or can horsemen use horsemanship to make people unhorsemanlike? 
Polemarchus:  No. 
Socrates:  Well, then, can just people use justice to make people unjust? In a word, 
can good people use their virtue or goodness to make people bad? 
Polemarchus:  No, they can’t. 
Socrates:  For it isn’t the function of heat to cool things down, I imagine, but that 
of its opposite. 
Polemarchus:  Yes. 
Socrates:  Nor the function of dryness to make things wet, but that of its opposite. 
Polemarchus:  Of course. 
Socrates:  So the function of a good person isn’t to harm, but that of his opposite. 
Polemarchus:  Apparently. 
Socrates:  So it isn’t the function of a just person to harm a friend or anyone else, 
Polemarchus, but that of his opposite, an unjust person. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16	  “Virtue	  (arête)	  is	  that	  state	  or	  property	  that	  makes	  something	  good.	  For	  example,	  the	  virtue	  of	  a	  knife	  
might	  include	  having	  a	  sharp	  blade”	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  glossary	  (p	  329)	  of	  C.D.C	  Reeve’s	  translation	  of	  
Plato’s	  Republic.	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Polemarchus:  I think you are absolutely right, Socrates. 
Socrates:  So if someone tells us it is just to give to each what he is owed, and 
understands by this that a just man should harm his enemies and benefit his 
friends, the one who says it is not wise.  I mean, what he says is not true.  For it 
has become clear to us that it is never just to harm anyone” (Plato, The Republic, 
Reeve translation,2004, p 11-12). 
 
What Plato lays out in this dialog seems entirely counterintuitive to any notion of 
punishment whatsoever because it explicitly prohibits harm, a seemingly central and 
indispensable element of punishment. In fact, if we recall the retributivist and the 
utilitarian thesis both endorsed the harm caused by punishment; they just justified for 
different reasons. To be more specific, as outlined in the Goldman chapter, the 
retributivist endorses harm as a way of giving the wrongdoer her just deserts while the 
utilitarian justifies the harm because it, all things considered, bestows greater benefits on 
society. Furthermore, both the utilitarian and the retributivist would undoubtedly claim 
that the harm bestowed by punishment, at least when done correctly, is overall a just 
practice though that too they would claim for different reasons. That being said, Plato’s 
suggestion to Polemarchus that inflicting any harm on anyone is unjust would seem to 
indict any system of punishment for wrongdoing.  
 However, we would be making a mistake if we were to take Plato’s prohibition 
of harm to conclude that Plato did not endorse punishment. Of course, Plato endorsed 
punishment but the conception of punishment he endorsed was far different from our 
current conception. The particulars of this nuanced conception are largely brought out in 
his Dialog the Gorgias and are nicely summarized in the book Plato on Punishment by 
Mackenzie which I will use to lay out Plato’s view. Plato’s discussion of punishment in 
the Gorgias, just like many of the philosophical puzzles brought out in Plato’s works, 
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begin with a question posed to Socrates. In this instance the question I want to focus on in 
the one of whether or not it’s better for a wrongdoer to be caught and punished for his 
wrongdoing or for him to get away with it and avoid paying the penalty. As McKenzie 
states it, for Plato the answer is the more controversial as he argue that “the unjust man 
who gets away with [wrongdoing] is worse off than the man who is punished for his 
wickedness” (Mackenzie, 179). 
In order to argue that a wrongdoer should be better off having been punished than 
getting away with it, Plato had to argue that punishment is inherently beneficial.  
Mackenzie breaks the argument down into the following 10 premises: 
1. “Paying the penalty [dikēn didonai] is the same thing as being punished justly 
[dikaiōs kolazesthai]. 
2. To every agent there corresponds a patient. 
3. The patient will be such as the agent makes it. (as for any transitive verb, if 
someone hits, something is hit) 
4. The effect on the patient may be qualified in exactly the same way as the act is 
qualified (476d3)… 
5. The man who punishes rightly [orthōs] punishes justly. 
6. So the punisher does just things, and the punished suffers just things (from 5 and 
6) 
7. All just things, qua just, are fine (476b1) 
E. Of two fine things, that one is finer which exceeds the other in pleasure or 
benefit or both. Similarly, of two shameful, that one is more shameful which 
exceeds the other in pain or harm or both. 
8. It would be absurd to suppose that he who suffers a just, and so fine, punishment 
enjoys a pleasure. (as continued in a footnote) That punishments are painful to the 
punished is, of course, true by definition C.F. Ch. 1c. 
9. So punishment is fine because it confers a benefit. 
10. Therefore the victim of punishment benefits from it.” (Mackenzie, 180)  
In summary, this argument claims that just punishment is by nature beneficial 
because by imposing a just act upon a wrongdoer, in this case punishment, one imposes a 
good thing upon the wrongdoer as justice by nature is good. Furthermore, because we can 
certainly not claim punishment is good because it is a source of pleasure it must be so 
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that punishment is good because it is beneficial. However, as Mackenzie is quick to point 
out, this argument is heavily flawed and overly ambiguous. Among other salient 
objections, there is a certainly a problem in the ambiguity in what Plato means by “just 
punishment.” As Mackenzie rightly questions “does Plato mean [just punishment is] what 
is exacted in accordance with the law, or in accordance with our moral intuitions? Clearly 
the two need not be the same. Second, derivate from this is an ambiguity about what is 
legal: if Plato is discussing legality, does he refer to actual laws, as he obeyed them, or to 
an ideal legal or penal code?” (Mackenzie, 181) 
Importantly, I need not, and shall not here defend either Plato’s problematic 
argument for how punishment is inherently beneficial to the wrongdoer or his motivation 
for reformative punishment as a way to impose virtue which would be inherently good 
for the subject. I will, however, take from Plato the spirit of what he is saying here which 
is that punishment should primarily benefit. Furthermore, I contend that focusing on 
helping the wrongdoer we do not simply unfairly advantage his interests but rather we 
help ourselves. In other words, if we invest in rehabilitative punishment that addresses 
the root cause of criminality we simultaneously act in an effort to retard further criminal 
acts. Furthermore, by focusing on rehabilitation we can avoid feelings of remorse because 
by doing so we acknowledge and act to correct our role in causing criminality as well as 
the extreme difficulty of escaping the conditions that lead to crime. 
Naturally not all crime comes as a result of some social injustice and some 
punishment seems very well deserved. Therefore there is a question as to how we can 
endorse rehabilitation for those that have committed crimes independent of the influences 
of social injustice. First, punishing using rehabilitation in all cases bestows a fundamental 
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benefit upon society in general by reducing the likelihood that further crime will be 
committed by the individual in question because it seeks to address the cause of 
criminality regardless of the cause. We should also keep in mind that just as both 
retributivism and utilitarianism are based on their respective moral principles, 
punishment centered on rehabilitation is also backed by very respectable moral 
principles: the moral principal that it is good to help people in general and that it is better 
to help people than harm them.  
Rehabilitation, additionally, conveniently avoids many of the most pressing 
worries that the retributivist must contend with. In particular, the retributivist must be 
ever vigilant in making certain that the punishment imposed on the wrongdoer is 
equivalent to the amount of harm due to wrongdoer. In other words, the punishment must 
always fit the crime. As previously stated, the consequences for punishing a wrongdoer 
beyond what is deserved are equivalent to those of harming an innocent person for no 
reason at all. However, when it comes to rehabilitation the stakes are much different 
because by rehabilitating a wrongdoing we are not explicitly seeking to harm them but 
rather help them. Therefore, the rehabilitationist has a little more flexibility in 
determining exactly how much rehabilitation is warranted by each act of wrongdoing 
because the consequences of being wrong are not additional years of suffering but rather 
more time spent in an effort to correct what can often be very complex issues. 
To the same degree, rehabilitation also avoids the pressing concerns that 
utilitarian must contend with. As outlined in the Goldman chapter, the utilitarian has a 
serious worry of not being able to avoid undeserved punishment in an effort to assure that 
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its primary goal of deterrence is reached. However, because rehabilitation is not focused 
on deterrence it avoids this concern entirely.  
There may, however, been some valid concern that punishment focused on 
rehabilitation would not have the effect in deterrence that some might find indispensable 
to any system of punishment. While I do still argue that punishment centered on 
rehabilitation is the best option after an individual has, unfortunately, already committed 
a criminal offense, the need for rehabilitation could be greatly reduced if we launched a 
preemptive strike at the heart of issues that cause criminality through the augmentation of 
our educational system, the implementation of outreach programs and other such 
preemptive measures.  
This augmentation would not only decrease the need for punishment by reducing 
the amount of crimes committed, it would also reduce criminality by decreasing the 
circumstances in which criminal activity is tempting by emphasizing the likely long-term 
cost a life of crime will incur at a young and impressionable age. For example, I do not 
think it is at all unreasonable to suppose that a frank explanation of exactly what 
unsavory realities such as the risk of drive-by shootings and raids by enemy gangs, the 
constant fear of apprehension by the law and endangerment of loved ones that inner city 
gang life entails would discourage many young people from feeling inclined to join as 
opposed to the more glorified explanation provided in the streets.  
Another reason to prefer a system of punishment predicated on a desire to 
rehabilitate like the one I am endorsing here is because it would seemingly be preferable 
to its alternatives behind a veil of ignorance such as the one described by Rawls in his 
book A Theory of Justice. The veil of ignorance taken from Rawls’ highly influential 
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book is a well-known philosophical tool to measure if a social practice is truly just. As 
Rawls suggests, to determine what social policies are truly just for all citizens we should 
imagine that before entering into the society we are placed behind this veil of ignorance 
thus making it impossible to know where in society we will end up meaning we could be 
poor, rich, a minority, a majority, a man, woman, child, old person or any person in any 
societal status. Because we don’t know where will end up and because a rational agent 
would never knowingly condemn herself to suffer injustice and because we cannot 
gamble on what societal position will end up in, the idea is that each person would only 
elect to impose the social policies that were fair to all people across all social levels. That 
being said, it would make sense that people would elect to impose a system of 
punishment that neither has the risk that they could be over punished as a means to deter 
other crime, as would be the worry under the utilitarian system, or the risk that they could 
be punished severely as a means to pay back their debt to society, as would be the worry 
under the retributive system. I argue it is far more likely that people would elect to be part 
of system that sought to address any injustices, societal disadvantages and criminal 
predispositions as would be the case with rehabilitation. 
Some might argue against my view that there would still be room for remorse in a 
rehabilitation-centered view of punishment. They may, for example, appeal to a case in 
which a wrongdoer immediately upon committing the criminal act, or shortly thereafter, 
has a drastic and complete change of heart in which she immediately understands the 
error of her ways and is deeply regretful for her actions. In other words, she is instantly 
rehabilitated, having absolutely no desire to ever commit such an act again thus rendering 
the kind of institutionalized rehabilitation I am proposing here useless.  In response, I 
Tragedy of Punishment                                                                                                                    	  
56	  	  
would argue that such cases are rare as evidenced by the high rates of recidivism and 
further that it would be practically impossible to determine who is genuinely rehabilitated 
as opposed to those looking to escape their punishment 
This also leads to the more general question as to how we would be able to 
determine exactly when rehabilitation is achieved. What I would suggest is instead of 
having a prison parole board mainly consisting of prison officials and administrators, that 
the parole boards be consisted of almost entirely trained psychiatric staff and experts in 
behavior prediction who would be more readily disposed to form accurate predictions 
that the wrongdoer has been successfully rehabilitated. In the cases where rehabilitation 
is impossible, which is conceivable, it would make sense to continue to work the 
individual to reach the highest level of rehabilitation possible but lifelong incarceration 
could be justified in these cases in the interest of protecting society from the inevitable 
harm caused by their release.  
The retributivist may object my rehabilitative punishment proposal on the grounds 
that by focusing on so much on the interest and betterment of the wrongdoer we would be 
giving the wrongdoer far more than he deserves. However, we must remember that the 
rehabilitative punishments would still be an exercise in the attempt to give people what 
they deserve. In fact, it would likely involve many of the same deprivation of rights that 
criminals currently face in our criminal justice. The chief difference is one of goals. For 
the retributivist, what matters is that the wrongdoer suffers as a way to pay the debt she 
owes to society. On the other hand for the rehabilitationist, what matters is still that the 
wrongdoer get what she deserve but also that we acknowledge that we may have played a 
role in causing the criminality and work to address it. Furthermore, as I have already 
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suggested, by seeking to help the wrongdoer we are simultaneously helping ourselves and 
looking after our interests as well.   
 
 
 
Conclusions 
	  
There might always be something regrettable about punishment due to fact that, 
under any conception of punishment, we must engage in the unsavory task of depriving 
our fellow man of certain rights and freedoms for extended periods of time. That being 
said, punishment should always be imposed with care and restraint. However, I argue that 
punishment need not be a source of remorse. By acknowledging the role our remorse 
plays in showing that we are in some sense complicit in the wrongdoing that leads to the 
need for both private and criminal punishment we can be led to the natural conclusion 
that we must work in an effort to correct the social injustice that in large part leads to 
criminality. In addition to some necessary societal reform, the way in which we both 
satisfy the need for some system of punishment as well as ameliorate the social issues 
that cause criminality is through a system of punishment similar to one which Plato 
advocates for, a system based on rehabilitation. This system of rehabilitation in addition 
to being preferential to the retributivist and utilitarian alternatives also seems to be the 
most just way of imposing punishment in a system so full of social injustice because it 
seeks to target and eliminate precisely the social injustice that causes our remorse in the 
first place. 
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 While I am fully aware of the difficulty of enacting meaningful change to the 
societal conditions in an effort to assuage some of our complicity, I still argue that it a 
necessary burden that we must shoulder. In fact, it is precisely the kind of attitude that 
solely focuses on cost that retards progress because sometimes a costly long-term 
investment is necessary especially when considering the centuries of injustice we are 
trying to fix. It is no surprise that meaningful change will come at the cost of significant 
resources and lots of time but when we consider the alternatives—namely, an 
unjustifiable and remorseful system of punishment imposing unjustified harm to 
thousands of our citizens—the cost becomes far more reasonable and even necessary in 
the interest in living in a society in which we can morally endorse our system of 
punishment.  
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As a student at Union College, I am part of a community that values intellectual effort, curiosity and 
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obligated to act with academic integrity. Therefore, I affirm that I will carry out my academic endeavors 
with full academic honesty, and I rely on my fellow students to do the same. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Tragedy of Punishment                                                                                                                    	  
60	  	  
 
 
 
 
 
Bibliography  
	  
Brown, Elizabeth & Males, Mike. (2011)Does Age or Poverty Level Best Predict  
Criminal Arrest and Homicide Rates? A Preliminary Investigation. Justice Policy 
Journal of the Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice. Vol. 8. (No. 1 Spring) pp 
1-30 
Deigh, John & Dolinko, David (Editors). The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of  
 Criminal Law. New York, Oxford : Oxford University Press. 2011 
Flango, Victor & Sherbenou, Edgar. (1976). Poverty, Urbanization and Crime.  
 Criminology. Vol. 14. (Issue 3). pp 331-346 
Goldman, Alan. (1979).The Paradox of Punishment. Philosophy and Public Affairs,  
Vol. 9. (No. 1 Autumn) pp 42-58 
Gross, Hyman. Crime and Punishment: A Concise Moral Critique. New York, Oxford :  
 Oxford University Press. 2012 
Plato. The Republic. Trans. C.D.C Reeve. Indianapolis & Cambridge:  
Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 2004 
Tragedy of Punishment                                                                                                                    	  
61	  	  
Plato. Dialogs. Trans B. Jowett, M.A. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1953 
Mackenzie, Mary. Plato on Punishment. Berkeley & Los Angeles & London:  
University of California Press. 1981 
Williams, Bernard. Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy. Cambridge, Massachusetts:  
 Harvard University Press, 1985  
 
